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AN UNWARRANTED INTRUSION: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES OF WASHINGTON'S
DNA COLLECTION LAW
Erin Curtis
Abstract: Washington State law requires all convicted felons to submit a biological
sample for purposes of DNA testing. Washington State courts have upheld this law as a
permissible search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Article I,
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, however, provides broader protections
against governmental intrusion than does its federal counterpart. Under the state
constitutional provision, law enforcement officials may disturb a citizen's private affairs only
if authority of law supports the disturbance. A statute alone cannot provide the requisite
authority; rather, the search prescribed must either be pursuant to a warrant or fall within one
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. This Comment argues that the DNA collection
statute is unconstitutional because it does not contain a warrant requirement and the required
collection does not fall within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Although the
statute applies only to convicted felons, who arguably have lesser privacy rights, the statute
permits an unconstitutional infringement of these rights because the prescribed search is not
predicated on a minimal level of suspicion.

Under Washington State law, law enforcement officials' must collect
2
a DNA sample from any adult or juvenile convicted of a felony. The
DNA collection statute, RCW 43.43.754, has survived constitutional
challenges under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
4
Constitution,3 which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
1. Cities and counties are responsible for obtaining biological samples from persons who serve
time in their jails; state facilities collect samples from felons who serve time there; and local
sheriff's offices or police departments are responsible for collecting samples from persons who
serve no time. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(l)(a)-(c) (2004). These provisions apply only to
persons convicted after July 1, 2002. Id. In fiscal year 2004, of 27,930 adult felony convictions in
Washington State, 34.5% (9,640) resulted in a prison sentence, 63% (17,572) resulted in jail, and
the other 2.5% (718) resulted in a sentence other than prison or jail. See SENTENCING GUIDELINE
COMM'N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING: FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 15 (Dec.

at
available
SENTENCING],
FELONY
[hereinafter
2004)
20 0
4-Statistical-Summary.pdf.
http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/Statistical%20Summaries/FY
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(1). The law also requires DNA collection from persons
convicted of harassment, stalking, or communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. Id. These
three crimes may constitute gross misdemeanors or class C felonies. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9A.46.020(2)(a) (2004) (harassment); id. § 9A.46.110(5)(a) (stalking); id. § 9.68A.090(l)
(communicating with a minor for immoral purposes).
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
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However, Washington State courts have not yet analyzed the
constitutionality of the statute under article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution, 5 which provides additional protection for
privacy rights. 6
Article I, section 7 of the state constitution prohibits the government
from invading citizens' private affairs without authority of law.7
Although this section provides protections similar to those of the Fourth
Amendment, Washington State courts have found that the state
constitution affords broader privacy rights than its federal counterpart.8
Specifically, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that "private
affairs" include privacy interests that Washington State citizens have
historically held and should be entitled to hold,9 and "authority of law"
to invade these interests must come from a warrant or one of the
carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.' ° Thus, when
determining the permissibility of a search, courts employ a separate
constitutional analysis under article I, section 7.11
This Comment argues that the collection of a biological sample under
Washington State's DNA collection statute is an unconstitutional search
because this collection involves a warrantless bodily intrusion that does
not fit within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. DNA
collection invades a person's private affairs and thus constitutes a search

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

4. See State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076, 1089 (1993); State v. Surge, 122
Wash. App. 448, 460, 94 P.3d 345, 351 (2004).
5. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 82, 856 P.2d at 1080; Surge, 122 Wash.
App. at 460, 94 P.3d at 351-52.
6. See State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202, 204 (2004).
7. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.").
8. See, e.g., Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204 (quoting State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d
328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002) ("[lIt is well settled that article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution provides greater protection to individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.").
9. See State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511,688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984).
10. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996); see also State v.
Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 352 n.3, 979 P.2d 833, 839 n.3 (1999) (finding that even where statute
purportedly provides "authority of law," it must still incorporate warrant requirement) (citing City
of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 274, 868 P.2d 134, 141 (1994)).
11. See, e.g., Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 153-54.

DNA Collection
under article I, section 7.12 This search lacks the requisite authority of
3
law because the statute does not require a warrant,' and the mandated
search does not fit within any of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. 14 Additionally, the protections of article I, section 7 apply
to convicted felons, as they do to other citizens. 15 Washington State
courts have established that article I, section 7 requires some level of
individualized suspicion before a search can take place, even when the
persons searched are convicted felons. 16 Because the DNA collection
statute constitutes an invasion of privacy without authority of law, it
violates the privacy protections of article I, section 7.
Part I of this Comment discusses the Washington State cases that
have upheld the DNA collection statute under the Fourth Amendment.
Part II provides an overview of article I, section 7 and examines how this
provision applies to bodily intrusions. Part III examines the privacy
rights of convicted felons under article I, section 7. Part IV argues that
the DNA collection statute's requirement that convicted felons submit to
DNA testing constitutes an unconstitutional invasion of private affairs
under article I, section 7. Finally, this Comment concludes that a
challenge to the statute under article I, section 7 should succeed where
prior Fourth Amendment challenges have failed.
I.

WASHINGTON STATE'S STATUTE HAS SURVIVED
FOURTH AMENDMENT SCRUTINY

Washington State courts have held that the state's DNA collection
statute, RCW 43.43.754, does not infringe on Fourth Amendment
rights. 17 The statute provides as follows:
Every adult or juvenile individual convicted of a felony, stalking
19
under RCW 9A.46. 110,18 harassment under RCW 9A.46.020,
12. See State v. Surge, 122 Wash. App. 448, 452, 94 P.3d 345, 348 (2004).
13. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2004).
14. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 70, 917 P.2d at 568 (listing exceptions to warrant

requirement for article I, section 7).
15. See, e.g., id. at 65, 70, 917 P.2d at 565, 568 (applying article 1, section 7 to search of inmate
who was serving sentence for manufacturing marijuana, a class C felony).
16. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d 929, 941-42 (1984) (holding
that article 1, section 7 requires at least "well-founded" suspicion for search of inmate on workrelease).
17. See State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076, 1089 (1993); State v. Surge, 122
Wash. App. 448, 460, 94 P.3d 345, 351 (2004).
18. Under this statute, stalking is a gross misdemeanor, unless circumstances are present that

449
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communicating with a minor for immoral purposes under RCW
9.68A.090, 20 or adjudicated guilty of an equivalent juvenile
offense must have a biological sample collected for purposes of
DNA identification analysis ....
21
The biological sample is collected via cheek swab or blood test, 22 and is
used "solely for the purpose of providing DNA or other tests for
identification analysis and prosecution of a criminal offense. 23 When
analyzing the statute under the Fourth Amendment, Washington State
25
courts have upheld the provision in both its current 24 and original
forms. In State v. Olivas,2 6 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld
the original version of the statute after determining that it survived
constitutional scrutiny under the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement. 27 In the 2004 case State v. Surge,28
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals first determined
that Olivas still controls, and then similarly upheld the current version of
the statute based on the "special needs" exception. 29 The Surge court
pointed out that the law could also survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny
under either the "minimally intrusive search" exception or the "totality
of the circumstances" test. 30 Neither the Olivas nor the Surge court

make it a class C felony. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.46.110(5)(a)-(b) (2004).
19. Under this statute, harassment is a gross misdemeanor, unless circumstances are present that
make it a class C felony. Id. § 9A.46.020(2)(a)-(b).
20. Under this statute, communicating with a minor for immoral purposes is a gross
misdemeanor, unless circumstances are present that make it a class C felony. Id. § 9.68A.090(l)(2).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(1) (2004).
22. See State v. Surge, 122 Wash. App. 448,451-52, 94 P.3d 345, 347 (2004).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(2).
24. See Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 460, 94 P.3d at 351. The current version of the statute mandates
DNA testing for anyone convicted of any felony. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(1).
25. See State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076, 1088 (1993). The previous version
of the statute mandated DNA testing for anyone convicted of a violent offense or sex offense. DNA
Identification Program, ch. 350, § 4, 1989 Wash. Laws 1749 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE
§ 43.43.754 (1990)). The statute was amended to include all convicted felons, ch. 271, § 402, 1994
Wash. Laws 1715, as well as directions as to who is responsible for DNA collection, ch. 230, § 3,
1990 Wash. Laws 1271.
26. 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993).
27. Id. at 98, 856 P.2d at 1088.
28. 122 Wash. App. 448, 94 P.3d 345 (2004).
29. Id. at 460, 94 P.3d at 351.
30. Id. at 459-60, 94 P.3d at 351.
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analyzed the constitutionality of the statute under article I, section 7.31
A.

Under the Fourth Amendment, Searches Are PermissibleOnly
When Conducted Pursuantto a Warrant or an Exception to the
WarrantRequirement

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures." 32 A search or seizure is reasonable
only if it is undertaken34pursuant to a warrant 33 or falls into one of the
"carefully delineated,,
"well-defined ' 35 exceptions to the warrant
requirement.36 Courts have determined that one such exception exists
when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
3 7 In
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.
such cases, courts weigh the privacy interest of the individual against the
government's interest in the search to determine whether a warrant
requirement is practicable under the circumstances. 38
An exception also exists when the governmental intrusion is
minimal. 39 To determine whether a search was minimally intrusive,
courts balance the government's interest in conducting the search, the
degree to which the search meets that interest, and the severity of the
intrusion on the individual. 40 Finally, the "totality of the circumstances"
test is similar to the "minimally intrusive" balancing test, in that courts
applying this test evaluate all of the facts surrounding a search, including
the severity of the intrusion, to determine whether a warrant was
required.4 1

31. See Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 82, 856 P.2d at 1080 (declining to address state constitutional
claims); Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 460, 94 P.3d at 351-52 (dismissing article I, section 7 claim).
32. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
33. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989).
34. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979), overruled on other grounds by California
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
35. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
36. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760 (1979).
37. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
38. Id.
39. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-51 (1979) (finding that warrantless seizures that are less
intrusive than traditional arrest may be reasonable under certain circumstances).
40. Id. at 50-51.
41. See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering multiple factors to
conclude that federal DNA databank was constitutional under Fourth Amendment).
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Courts Have Upheld Washington State's DNA Collection Statute
Under the "SpecialNeeds" Exception to the FourthAmendment
WarrantRequirement

Washington State courts have held that the DNA collection statute is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.4 2 The original version of
the statute, upheld in Olivas,4 3 mandated DNA collection from only
those persons convicted of a violent offense or sex crime.44 Though the
court found that a blood draw constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment,45 the court held that the statute met the "special needs"
exception to the warrant requirement.46
When analyzing the special needs exception, the Olivas court
examined a federal case upholding a Virginia law requiring DNA
collection from all convicted felons.47 In Jones v. Murray,48 the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia held that the
DNA collection statute served a special need beyond law enforcement.4 9
The court cited a study that reported that nearly sixty-three percent of
incarcerated felons were re-arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor
within three years of release. 50 The study also found that approximately
twenty-three percent of the felons studied were re-arrested for a violent
42. See State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 98, 856 P.2d 1076, 1089 (1993); State v. Surge, 122
Wash. App. 448,460, 94 P.3d 345,351 (2004).
43. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 98, 856 P.2d at 1089.
44. See DNA Identification Program, ch. 350, § 4, 1989 Wash. Laws 1749 (codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (1990), amended by ch. 271, § 402, 1994 Wash. Laws 1715 (including all
convicted felons); ch. 230, § 3, 1990 Wash. Laws 1271 (including directions as to who is
responsible for DNA collection); Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 83 n.17, 856 P.2d at 1081 n. 17.
45. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 83, 856 P.2d at 1081.
46. See Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 97-98, 856 P.2d at 1088. In Olivas, the Washington State
Supreme Court addressed the question of "whether the drawing of blood for DNA testing pursuant
to RCW 43.43.754 constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under the state and federal
constitutions." Id. at 81, 856 P.2d at 1080. However, the court declined to consider the state
constitutional grounds. Id. at 82, 856 P.2d at 1081.
47. Id. at 91-93, 98, 856 P.2d at 1085-86, 1088 (discussing Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842,
844-48 (W.D. Va. 1991), ajffd in part,rev'd in part,962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992)).
48. 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
49. Id. at 844-48.
50. See id. at 846 n.9. Although the Jones court does not quote the percentages stated in the text
accompanying this footnote, the Olivas court evidently looked at these studies and determined the
relevant recidivism rates. See Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 92, 856 P.2d at 1085 (citing ALLEN J. BECK
& BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 116261, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF

PRISONERS
RELEASED
IN
1983,
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr83.pdf).

1

(Apr.

1989),

available

at
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offense within three years of release. 5 1 Another study reported that a
perpetrator left his or her DNA at the crime scene in thirty percent of
violent crimes. 2 Based on this information, the court concluded that a
DNA database would significantly deter recidivist activity.53 When the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard the case, it
did not employ the "special needs" analysis. 4 Rather, the court upheld
the DNA collection law based on the limited privacy rights of convicted
felons and the minimal intrusiveness of a blood test.55
The Washington State Supreme Court agreed with the Jones district
court's reasoning and declined to follow the analysis of the appellate
court. 56 The Olivas court rejected the Fourth Circuit's rationale because
the Olivas court believed that the Fourth Circuit had "diminished the
privacy rights of convicted persons" when it determined that a "need
beyond law enforcement" was not required to uphold the statute. 57 The
Olivas court concluded that the district court's "special needs" analysis
was the "better reasoned approach" and58upheld the Washington State
DNA collection statute on these grounds.
In July 2004, several convicted felons challenged the constitutionality
of the DNA collection law.5 9 In State v. Surge, the felons argued that the
statute was no longer justifiable under the "special needs" exception
because the legislature had amended the DNA collection law to require
DNA sampling from all felons for the primary purpose of general law
enforcement. 60 The felons further argued that the Olivas decision is no
longer good law in light of U.S. Supreme Court decisions that clarified
when the "special needs" exception is applicable. 6 1 The Court had held
that a hospital urine-testing program and a vehicle check-point program
51. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 846 n.9 (citing BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 50, at 1); see also Olivas,
122 Wash. 2d at 92, 856 P.2d at 1085 (stating that "approximately 22.7 percent were arrested for a
violent offense within 3 years of release").
52. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 847 (citing study from Virginia Department of Criminal Justice
Services).
53. Id.
54. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1992).
55. Id. at 305-08.
56. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 93, 856 P.2d at 1086.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. State v. Surge, 122 Wash. App. 448, 449-50, 94 P.3d 345, 346-47 (2004).
60. See id. at 456, 94 P.3d at 349-50.
61. Id. at 454-55, 94 P.3d at 349 (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-86
(2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-48 (2000)).
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violated the Fourth Amendment because these programs were created
for the purpose of law enforcement; thus they could not be justified
under the "special needs" exception. 62 The Surge plaintiffs similarly
argued that because the primary purpose of the DNA collection statute
was for law enforcement, warrantless DNA collection could not be
justified under the "special needs" exception.6 3
Division I rejected the Surge plaintiffs' arguments and upheld the
current version of the statute based on the "special needs" exception.
The court distinguished the two U.S. Supreme Court cases because
neither case involved DNA collection from felons. 65 The court also
turned to a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in which the court upheld a Wisconsin DNA collection statute. 66 The
Seventh Circuit determined that because the purpose of the DNA testing
was, in part, to reliably identify felons, it served a "special need., 67 The
Surge court found this analysis persuasive and determined that the
Washington State DNA collection statute fit the "special need"
exception because
the purpose of the state law was to identify felons and
68
curb recidivism.
C.

Division I Has Indicated that the DNA Collection Statute Could
Also Survive Under Other Exceptions to the FourthAmendment

In addition to the "special needs" analysis employed by the court in
Olivas, Division I considered DNA collection under other exceptions to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 69 The Surge court
determined that Olivas was binding and thus upheld the statute based on
62. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79-83, 85-86 (urine-testing); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (vehicle
check-point).
63. Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 455-56, 856 P.2d at 349. The appellants also argued that the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 354
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled State v. Olivas. Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 456-57, 94 P.3d at
350. The Kincade court held unconstitutional a federal statute mandating parolees to provide DNA
samples to the federal DNA database. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1096. At the time Surge was decided,
the Ninth Circuit had vacated Kincade, but had not yet reversed it. Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 450,
94 P.3d at 346-47. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed Kincade after rehearing the case en
bane. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 840 (2004), cert denied,- U.S. - (Mar. 21, 2005).
64. Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 460, 94 P.3d at 351.
65. See id. at 456, 94 P.3d at 350.
66. Id. at 457, 94 P.3d at 350 (citing Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2004)).
67. See Green, 354 F.3d at 679.
68. Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 459, 94 P.3d at 351.
69. See id. at 459-60, 94 P.3d at 351.
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that opinion. 70 However, the Surge court also stated in dicta that, even if
the statute failed to qualify under the special needs exception to the
warrant requirement, it could nevertheless survive under the "totality of
the circumstances" test or the "minimally intrusive search" exception to
the warrant requirement.7'
In sum, Washington State courts have upheld the DNA collection
statute against Fourth Amendment challenges. Collection of a biological
sample constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment; however,
courts have held that this search is permissible under the "special needs"
exception to the warrant requirement because DNA collection serves an
important function outside of law enforcement. Division I has indicated
that the statute could also be upheld under the "totality of the
circumstances" test or the "minimally intrusive search" exception to the
warrant requirement. Washington State courts have not yet addressed the
constitutionality of DNA collection under article I, section 7 of the state
constitution.
II.

THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS
AGAINST INVASIONS OF PRIVACY RIGHTS

Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution protects
citizens from invasions of their "private affairs" absent "authority of
law.",72 Washington State courts have determined that this section
provides broader privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment.73
Courts have concluded that a bodily intrusion is an invasion of a
person's private affairs.74 Thus bodily intrusions, like other invasions of
75
private affairs, are permissible only with proper "authority of law.

70. Id. at 460, 94 P.3d at 351.
71. Id. at 459-60, 94 P.3d at 351.

72. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
73. See, e.g., State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202, 204 (2004) (quoting State v.

Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002), for proposition that "it is well settled that
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection to individual privacy
rights than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution").
74. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000)

(stating that there is "no doubt that the privacy interest in the body and bodily functions is one
Washington citizens have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass").

75. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 270,
868 P.2d 134, 139 (1994) (breaking article I, section 7 into two components and finding that
disturbance of person's "private affairs" invokes protections of section, which requires "authority of
law" for disturbance).
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Under article I, section 7, a warrant or exception to the warrant
requirement provides this authority.7 6 A statute alone cannot provide
authority of law.77
A.

Washington State Courts Have Recognized that Article 1, Section 7
Provides BroaderPrivacyRights than the FourthAmendment

Washington State courts have held that article I, section 7 provides
greater privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.7 8 At the 1889 Washington State Constitutional Convention,
the attendees rejected language identical to the Fourth Amendment.79
Instead, article I, section 7 states that: "No person shall be disturbed in
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." 80 In
State v. Gunwall,81 the Washington State Supreme Court determined that
article I, section 7 provides greater privacy protections than the Fourth
Amendment. 82 , In Gunwall, the Washington State Supreme Court
elucidated six nonexclusive criteria for courts to review to determine
whether the Washington State Constitution provides more expansive
rights than its federal counterpart. 83 For several years after Gunwall was
decided, courts continued to require parties to provide an analysis of the
Gunwall factors to establish a claim under the state constitution, rather
than its federal counterpart.84 However, the Washington State Supreme
Court has since determined that Gunwall analysis is no longer necessary
because it is "well settled" that article I, section 7 provides broader
76. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833, 838 (1999); State v. Hendrickson,
129 Wash. 2d 61, 70-71,917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
77. See Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 352 n.3, 979 P.2d at 839 n.3.
78. See, e.g., Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204 (quoting State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d
328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002) ("[I]t is well settled that article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution provides greater protection to individual privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.").
79. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66, 720 P.2d 808, 814 (1986).
80. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
81. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
82. See id. at 66-67, 720 P.2d at 815.
83. Those criteria are: (1) the textual language of the constitution; (2) significant differences in
the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) state constitutional and
common law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) differences in structure between the federal and
state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local concern. Id. at 61-62, 720
P.2d at 812-13.
84. See, e.g., State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d 103, 110-11, 960 P.2d 927, 930 (1998) (considering
Ferrier's state constitutional claim because she addressed the "required" Gunwall factors).

456
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protections than the Fourth Amendment for individual privacy rights. 85
B.

PrivateAffairs Are Those Privacy Interests HistoricallyHeld by
Washington State Citizens, Which Includes Freedomfrom Bodily
Intrusion

Washington State courts have concluded that bodily intrusion
constitutes an invasion into a person's "private affairs" under article I,
section 7.86 To determine the scope of a person's private affairs, courts
use an objective standard, which is based on the privacy interests that
citizens of the state have historically held and should be entitled to
hold.87 Such protections are broader than the Fourth Amendment, which
the U.S. Supreme 88Court has expressly declined to interpret as a general
"right to privacy."
1.

The State Testfor a Right of Privacy Is Objective

In State v. Myrick,89 the Washington State Supreme Court established
that article I, section 7 protects not only subjective expectations of
privacy, but also "those privacy interests which citizens of this state have
held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass." 90
The Myrick court stated that privacy protections are not confined to the
subjective expectations of modem citizens who, due to advances in
technology, may expect more invasions of their privacy. 9 1 Thus, to
establish whether a right of privacy exists, courts must determine
whether the privacy interest asserted is one that the state has historically
92
recognized.
Washington State courts have rejected the proposition that a person's
subjective expectation of privacy determines whether a warrantless

85. State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202, 204 (2004) (quoting State v. Jones, 146
Wash. 2d 328, 332,45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002)).
86. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000)
(stating that there is "no doubt that the privacy interest in the body and bodily functions is one
Washington citizens have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass").
87. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511,688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984).
88. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (stating that "the Fourth Amendment cannot
be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy').
89. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
90. Id. at 511,688 P.2d at 154.
91. Id.
92. State v. Carter, 151 Wash. 2d 118, 126, 85 P.3d 887, 890 (2004).
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governmental intrusion is permissible.93 In State v. Hendrickson,94 the
Washington State Supreme Court found it irrelevant whether the
defendant, an inmate on work release, had a diminished expectation of
privacy. 95 The court stated that an "expectation of privacy, even if
reduced. . does not constitute an exception to the requirement of a
warrant under art. 1, § 7. ' 96 Similarly, in State v. Ladson,97 the
Washington State Supreme Court pointed out that, unlike its federal
counterpart, article 1, section 7 does not "operate[] on a downward
98
ratcheting mechanism of diminishing expectations of privacy.,
2.

Bodily Intrusion Constitutes an Invasion of a Person's "Private
Affairs"

Washington State courts have established that an intrusion into the
body constitutes an invasion of a person's "private affairs." 99 In
Robinson v. City of Seattle,100 Division I concluded that bodily intrusions
necessarily implicate a person's "private affairs," for "[t]here is. . . no
doubt that the privacy interest in the body... is one Washington citizens
have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental
trespass."' 0 1 Furthermore, courts have specifically determined that,
collection and analysis of biological
under the Fourth Amendment,
02
samples constitutes a search.'
C.

Authority of Law May Comefrom a Warrantor an Exception to the
WarrantRequirement
The authority of law required by article I, section 7 may come from a

93. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (finding that
person's reduced expectation of privacy does not constitute exception to warrant requirement).
94. 129 Wash. 2d 61, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
95. Id. at 65-66, 71, 917 P.2d at 565-66, 568.
96. Id. at 71, 917 P.2d at 568.
97. 138 Wash. 2d 343, 979 P.2d 833 (1999).
98. Id. at 349, 979 P.2d at 837.
99. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000)
(stating that there is "no doubt that the privacy interest in the body and bodily functions is one
Washington citizens have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass").
100. 102 Wash. App. 795, 10 P.3d 452 (2000).
101. Id. at 819, 10 P.3d at 465.
102. See, e.g., State v. Surge, 122 Wash. App. 448, 452, 94 P.3d 345, 347-48 (2004).
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warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. 0 3 Any search
conducted without a warrant is unreasonable per se. 104 However,
Washington State courts have identified six exceptions to the warrant
requirement, under which a warrantless search may be constitutionally
permissible.'0 5 The burden is on the state to prove that any warrantless
intrusion falls within one of these categories. 0 6 Washington State courts
have not recognized the "minimally intrusive search," "special needs,"
or "totality of the circumstances" exceptions 0 7 under article I, section 7.
1.

WarrantlessSearches May Be Permissibleif They Fall Within One
of the Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

A search is permissible if it is undertaken pursuant to a warrant or if it
fits within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. °8 Under
09
article I, section 7, warrantless searches are unreasonable per se.'
103. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70-71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (holding that
under article 1, section 7, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and must fit exception from
warrant requirement to be constitutionally permissible).
104. Id. at 70, 917 P.2d at 568.
105. See id. at 71, 917 P.2d at 568.
106. Id.
107. Although there is no case law explicitly rejecting these exceptions, the Washington State
Supreme Court has not listed them among the exceptions it does recognize. See, e.g., id. at 71, 917
P.2d at 568 (listing exceptions to warrant requirement).
108. Id. at 70, 917 P.2d at 568.
109. Id. Courts may issue warrants only where they are authorized by a statute or court rule. See
State v. Lansden, 144 Wash. 2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 383, 487 (2001). Such authority exists permitting
courts to issue warrants for crime-related searches. Id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 10.79.015(3)
(2004) (authorizing magistrate to issue warrant for investigation or prosecution of any felony);
WASH. CR. L.J. 2.3(b) (authorizing courts to issue warrants to search and seize evidence of crime).
However, the Lansden court pointed out that the parties cited no analogous provisions providing
general authority allowing courts to issue warrants for civil infractions. Lansden, 144 Wash. 2d at
663, 30 P.3d at 487. Instead, individual statutes provide this authority in specific situations. See,
e.g., id. at 663 n.5, 30 P.3d at 487 n.5 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 15.09.070 (horticultural pests and
diseases); id. § 15.17.190 (grade of fruits and vegetables); id. § 16.57.180 (livestock and hides); id.
§ 17.24.021 (plant and bee pests and diseases); id. § 19.94.260 (weights and measures); id.
§ 69.50.502 (pharmaceutical premises)); City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 272 n.3,
868 P.2d 134, 140 n.3 (1994) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 17.10.160 (noxious weed laws); id.
§ 51.48.200 (certain tax laws); id. § 66.32.020 (liquor laws); id. § 69.41.060 (legend drugs); id.
§ 75.10.090 (unlawfully caught foodfish or shellfish); id. § 77.12.120 (contraband game)). Unlike
warrants for crime-related purposes, judges issue these so-called "administrative" search warrants
under statutes that do not always require a showing of probable cause. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 15.17.190 (2004) (authorizing court to issue search warrant, without requiring showing of
probable cause, where director of Department of Agriculture is denied entry to fruit and vegetable
facilities during business hours). The party requesting a warrant need show only that he or she was
denied entry into an area that he or she wished to search for purposes of ensuring compliance with a
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However, the Washington State Supreme Court recognizes "a few
'jealously and carefully drawn exceptions' to the warrant
requirement."' "1° The court delineated these exceptions in State v.
Hendrickson: (1) consent; (2) searches incident to a valid arrest; (3)2
inventory searches; (4) plain view;"' (5) Terry investigative stops;"
and (6) exigent circumstances.' 13
State and federal courts have defined these categories." 4 Consent that5
is neither coerced nor involuntary obviates the need for a warrant.'
Searches incident to a valid arrest must be contemporaneous with the
arrest, 1 6 and they must be conducted for the purpose of securing
evidence and ensuring officer safety.' 17 Inventory searches of a
defendant's belongings are undertaken upon the defendant's
incarceration to insulate law enforcement officials from claims of lost or
damaged property." 8 The "plain view" exception applies where a law
enforcement officer is lawfully in a constitutionally protected area and
inadvertently identifies an object as contraband.' 9 Terry searches allow
particular chapter of the Revised Code of Washington. See id.
110. See State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980) (quoting Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979)).
111. Hendrikson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.2d at 568.
112. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968). In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ...he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons." Id. at
30.
113. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.2d at 568.
114. The protections of article 1, section 7 are "never less than those of the Fourth amendment."
Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000). Accordingly,
federal courts' definitions of these exceptions under the Fourth Amendment are relevant to
Washington State courts' definitions of these exceptions under article 1, section 7.
115. See State v. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 830 P.2d 658, 661 (1992).
116. See State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970, 974 (1977). The Smith court quoted
State v. Gluck, 83 Wash. 2d 424, 428, 518 P.2d 706-07 (1974), to delineate the three purposes of an
inventory search: "(1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during detention, property belonging
to a detained person, (2) protecting police from liability due to dishonest claims of theft, and (3)
protecting temporary storage bailees against false charges." Smith, 76 Wash. App. at 16, 882 P. 2d
at 194. Although Smith discussed the Fourth Amendment, Washington State courts have established
that the protections of article I, section 7 are "never less than those of the Fourth amendment,"
Robinson, 102 Wash. App. at 819, 10 P.3d at 465, and thus the rationale applies to state
constitutional analyis as well.
117. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
118. See Smith, 76 Wash. App. at 16, 882 P.2d at 194.
119. See State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 267, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (finding that for
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an officer to briefly detain and120perform a surface-level frisk of a person
suspected of criminal activity.
The "exigent circumstances" exception applies to situations where
22
obtaining a warrant would be impractical. 12 In State v. Counts,' the
Washington State Supreme Court delineated various circumstances in
which the exception would apply: cases involving hot pursuit, a fleeing
suspect, danger to the arresting officer or to the public, where mobility
of the suspect's vehicle is a factor, or where there is danger involving
mobility or destruction of evidence. 123 The U.S. Supreme Court has used
the "exigent circumstances" exception to justify a bodily intrusion in the
was at issue. 124
form of a blood draw where intoxication of the suspect
Because alcohol in the bloodstream dissipates over time, the Court found
that exigent circumstances justified this warrantless intrusion to secure
evidence. 125 Thus, in limited circumstances, "exigent circumstances"
may justify a warrantless intrusion into the body.
2.

Washington State CourtsHave Not Applied All FourthAmendment
Warrant Exceptions When Analyzing Cases UnderArticle I,
Section 7

Under article I, section 7, "minimally intrusive" searches are not
exempt from the warrant requirement.126 Although the U.S Supreme
Court has recognized that warrantless, minimally instrusive searches
27
Washington State
may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,

plain view exception to apply, there must be "(1) a prior justification for the intrusion, (2) an
inadvertent discovery of incriminating evidence, and (3) immediate knowledge by the police that
they have evidence before them") (citations omitted).
120. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
121. See State v. Muir, 67 Wash. App. 149, 152, 835 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1992).
122. 99 Wash. 2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983).
123. Id. at 60, 659 P.2d at 1089-90 (citations omitted).
124. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
125. Id. An individual's DNA, in contrast, does not dissipate over time. See Dan L. Burk, DNA
Fingerprinting:Possibilitiesand Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 455, 470 (1988)
(stating that because DNA fragment patterns do not diminish over time, unlike blood-alcohol levels,
exigencies that permit warrantless blood draws may not be present for DNA samples).
126. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (listing exceptions
to warrant requirement and omitting "minimally intrusive" searches).
127. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (finding that reasonableness of
intrusion less than traditional arrest depends on balancing of public's interests against individual's
privacy interests).
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courts have not recognized this exception under article I, section 7.12'
When the Hendrickson court, applying article I, section 7, outlined the
"jealously and carefully drawn exceptions" to the warrant requirement, it
did not list an exception for minimally intrusive searches. 129 Justice
Utter's concurrence in Olivas further indicates the nonexistence of a
minimally intrusive search exception under article I, section 7.130 Justice
Utter stated that the DNA collection statute could be upheld based on
"traditional doctrines of criminal Fourth Amendment law,"'131 and he
pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a minimally
intrusive search exception. 132 The justice made clear that he was
analyzing only the Fourth Amendment, and he explicitly declined to
address how his opinion in Olivas would relate to his concurring opinion
in State v. Curran,'33 a similar case that was decided under article I,
section 7.134
Division I has determined that the "special needs" exception does not
apply to the article I, section 7 warrant requirement, but it has applied an
analogous test. 135 In Robinson v. City of Seattle, Division I determined
that the Fourth Amendment "special needs" analysis was inapplicable
under the state constitution. 136 Instead, the court applied a similar "strict
scrutiny" test that considered whether the government had a compelling
interest that it achieved through narrowly tailored means. 137 In applying
strict scrutiny, Division I followed the precedent set by the Washington
State Supreme Court in In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 138 a case in which

128. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71,917 P.2d at 568.
129. See id. at 70-71, 917 P.2d at 568 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979)).
130. See State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 102-08, 856 P.2d 1076, 1091-94 (1993) (Utter, J.,
concurring) (analyzing "minimally intrusive" warrant exception under Fourth Amendment
doctrine).
131. Id. at 99, 856 P.2d at 1089 (Utter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Utter pointed out
that one of the kinds of searches upheld under this exception are Terry searches, which are also
recognized exceptions under article I, section 7. Id. at 103-04, 856 P.2d at 1091-92 (Utter, J.,
concurring). However, law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion prior to undertaking such a
search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Thus, although Terry searches are minimally intrusive,
this feature alone does not make them permissible searches. Id.
132. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 103, 856 P.2d at 1091-92 (Utter, J., concurring).
133. 116 Wash. 2d 174, 804 P.2d 558 (1991).
134. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 99 n.85, 856 P.2d at 1089 n.85 (Utter, J., concurring).
135. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 816, 10 P.3d 452, 464-65 (2000).
136. Id.
137. Id.

138. 121 Wash. 2d 80, 847 P.2d 455 (1993).
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the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of post-conviction HIV
testing. 139 The Robinson court subsequently determined that the
ordinance at issue, which required pre-employment drug testing for
certain city government positions, violated the state constitution by
failing the second prong ("narrowly tailored") of the "strict scrutiny"
test. 4 °
Washington State courts have not created a separate exception under
which the "totality of the circumstances" could justify a warrantless
search. Although courts look at the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether a given search is permissible, they do so only to
determine whether the search fits within one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. 141 Courts have established that the totality of the
circumstances must be considered when determining the voluntariness of
consent to search, 142 whether exigent circumstances existed to justify144a
143
and whether a Terry stop was reasonable.
warrantless search,
However, courts have not found that the totality of the circumstances can
justify a search that does not fit within one of the "jealously and
45
carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. In fact, courts
have explicitly rejected the totality of the circumstances test in certain
vehicle.' 46
situations, such as those involving searches of an arrestee's
Thus, although courts consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining the validity of a search, courts have not created a separate
"totality of the circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement of
article I, section 7.

139. See Robinson, 102 Wash. App. at 816-17, 10 P.3d at 464 (quoting A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.
2d at 96-97).
140. Id. at 826-27, 10 P.3d at 469.
141. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 151 Wash. 2d 118, 128-30, 85 P.3d 887, 892 (2004) (analyzing
totality of circumstances to determine whether exigent circumstances were present to justify
warrantless search).
142. See State v. Bustamante-Davila, 138 Wash. 2d 964,981,983 P.2d 590, 599 (1999).
143. See Carter,151 Wash. 2d at 128-30, 85 P.3d at 892.
144. See State v. Acrey, 148 Wash. 2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594, 598 (2003).
145. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (listing exceptions
to warrant requirement and omitting totality of circumstances).
146. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 151, 720 P.2d 436, 440 (1986) (finding that totality
of circumstances test was too burdensome on law enforcement and "clearer line" was needed).
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A Statute Alone CannotProvide "Authority of Law "for a
WarrantlessSearch

When upholding searches conducted pursuant to statute, the
Washington State Supreme Court has employed the same rationale used
to justify other warrantless searches. 147 Although the Gunwall court
stated that "authority of law" may come from a valid statute, 148 the
Washington State Supreme Court has since rejected the proposition that
"authority of law" may be supplied by a statute in lieu of a warrant or an
exception to the warrant requirement. 149 The Ladson court determined
that the statement in Gunwall meant only that a statute may authorize a
court to issue a warrant, not that the warrant requirement may be skirted
altogether. 50 The Ladson court also cited to Justice Madsen's
concurrence in In re PersonalRestraint of Maxfield,151 which stated that
"[t]his court has never found that a statute requiring a procedure less
than a search warrant... constitutes 'authority of law' justifying an
intrusion into the 'private affairs' of its citizens. 152
The Washington State Supreme Court has upheld statutorily
prescribed searches under article I, section 7, but in doing so it relied on
the rationale underlying previously delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.15 3 In State v. Curran,154 the court considered a warrantless
blood draw from a vehicular homicide suspect, conducted pursuant to
RCW 46.20.308, and upheld the blood draw against constitutional

147. See, e.g., State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991) (analyzing
statutorily prescribed search based on Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966), in
which Supreme Court cited exigent circumstances to uphold analogous search).
148. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 68, 720 P.2d 808, 816 (1986).
149. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 352 n.3, 979 P.2d 833, 839 n.3 (1999).
150. See id. (citing City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 274, 868 P.2d 134, 141
(1994)).
151. 133 Wash. 2d 332, 945 P.2d 196 (1997).
152. Id. at 345, 945 P.2d at 203 (Madsen, J., concurring). Justice Madsen dissented in Ladson,
arguing that the motive of law enforcement officials for conducting traffic stops was irrelevant
because various statutes provided the requisite "authority of law" to make such stops. Ladson, 138
Wash. 2d at 360-62, 979 P.2d at 843-44 (Madsen, J., dissenting). However, she based her opinion
on the fact that those statutes encompass a probable cause standard, and thus codify a
"constitutionally valid standard for warrantless traffic stops." Id.
153. See State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991) (upholding statutorily
prescribed search based on rationale of U.S. Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California,which cited
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless blood draw from a drunken driving suspect, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71 (1966)).
154. 116 Wash. 2d 174, 804 P.2d 558 (1991).
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challenges under article I, section 7.155 The Curran court analogized the
facts of the case to the facts of a U.S. Supreme Court case, Schmerber v.
California.156 In Schmerber, the Court upheld the warrantless blood
draw of an intoxicated driver under the exigent circumstances exception
15 7 Although the
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
Washington State Supreme Court did not determine which warrant
exception applied in Curran, the court implicitly adopted the exigent
court's
circumstances exception when it relied on the Schmerber
158
draw.
blood
prescribed
statutorily
the
analysis to approve
In sum, Washington State courts have determined that bodily
intrusion constitutes an invasion into a citizen's private affairs under
article I, section 7. Such invasion is permissible only where law
enforcement officials take this action pursuant to a warrant, or where the
circumstances fall within one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Where a statute authorizes a search, courts evaluate the
search under the same criteria used to determine the constitutionality of
warrantless searches.
III.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 PROTECTS THE PRIVATE AFFAIRS
OF PROBATIONERS, PAROLEES, AND INMATES

The Washington State Supreme Court has determined that law
enforcement officials must abide by the protections provided by article I,
section 7 in conducting any search. 159 Although Washington State courts
16
have stated that probationers, 160 parolees, 161 and inmates ' have a
reduced expectation of privacy, which results in diminished privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7, the cases
that established these propositions were decided before Gunwall, and
163
thus were based solely on Fourth Amendment authority. More recent
155. Id. at 185, 804 P.2d at 564.

156. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
157. See id. at 770-71.
158. See Curran, 116 Wash. 2d at 183-85, 804 P.2d at 563-64 (concluding that facts of Curran
were similar to those of Schmerber and determining that blood draw was reasonable).
159. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (stating that
"expectation of privacy, even if reduced... does not constitute an exception to the requirement of a
warrant under art. I, § 7").
160. See State v. Lampman, 45 Wash. App. 228, 233, 724 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1986).
161. See Hocker v. Woody, 95 Wash. 2d 822, 826, 631 P.2d 372, 375 (1981).
162. See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d 929, 941-42 (1984).
163. See Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 22, 691 P.2d at 941; Hocker, 95 Wash. 2d at 826, 631 P.2d
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case law indicates that a person's subjective "expectation of privacy" is
irrelevant under article I, section 7.164 Regardless, searches of these
6
persons must be predicated on some level of suspicion. 1
A.

Courts in Post-Gunwall Cases Have Indicated that the Full
ProtectionsofArticl I, Section 7 Apply to Convicted Criminals

Washington State courts purporting to apply article I, section 7 to
searches of probationers,166 parolees,1 67 and inmates 68 have found that
these individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy, and thus they
may be searched based on less than probable cause.' 69 However, these
courts have cited pre-Gunwall cases that applied only the Fourth
Amendment.
More recent cases indicate that a reduction in a
subjective expectation of privacy does not result in a reduction of
privacy rights. 171
In the 1984 case of State v. Campbell, 72 the Washington State
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search of a vehicle belonging to
an inmate on work release. 73 The court determined that because other
courts had held that searches of probationers and parolees may be based
on less than probable cause, this lower predicate should apply to inmates
on work release as well. 74 The Campbell court supported this
proposition by citing Hocker v. Woody, 175 a case decided under the

at 375; Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 233, 724 P.2d at 1095.
164. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.2d at 568; see also State v. Parker, 139 Wash.
2d 486, 495, 987 P.2d 73, 79 (1999) (stating that Hendrickson court "expressly held that any alleged
subjective expectation of privacy, even if it were reduced, does not constitute an exception to the
requirement of a warrant under art. I, § 7") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
165. See Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 22, 691 P.2d at 941; see also Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at
233, 724 P.2d at 1095 (requiring well-founded suspicion for search of probationer).
166. See Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 233, 724 P.2d at 1095.
167. Hocker, 95 Wash. 2d at 826, 631 P.2d at 375.
168. See Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 22-23, 691 P.2d at 941-42.
169. See, e.g., Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 232-33, 724 P.2d at 1095 (holding that probationer
could be searched based on well-founded suspicion); see also Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 22-23,
691 P.2d at 941 (holding that inmates may be searched based on well-founded suspicion).
170. See infra notes 173-83 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
172. 103 Wash. 2d 1,691 P.2d 929 (1984).
173. Id. at 23, 691 P.2d at 942.
174. Id. at 22-23, 691 P.2d at 941-42.
175. 95 Wash. 2d 822, 631 P.2d 372 (1981).
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Fourth Amendment. 176 The Campbell court referred only to a
protection," and did not discuss
"diminution of Fourth Amendment
177
protection.
7
article I, section
Similarly, in the 1986 case of State v. Lampman,178 Division II of the
Washington State Court of Appeals stated that a probationer has a
diminished expectation of privacy, and thus he or she could be searched
based on only a "well-founded suspicion,"' 79 rather than the higher
probable cause predicate. However, the court then cited to State v.
Keller 180 and State v. Simms, 181 two cases in which the court of appeals
decided that, under the Fourth Amendment, probationers and parolees
have reduced expectations of privacy and are thus excepted from the
warrant requirement. 182 The Lampman court also cited Hocker for the
expectation of privacy
proposition that a probationer has a diminished
83
privacy.'
of
right
diminished
and thus a
More recent decisions show that a person's subjective "expectation[]
of privacy" does not determine his or her level of protection under article
I, section 7.184 Washington State courts have determined that this
principle holds true even where the subject of the search may appear to
have lesser rights than other citizens.'85 In State v. Hendrickson, the
court rejected the argument that because the defendant was an inmate,
176. See id. at 824, 826, 631 P.2d at 374, 375. In Hocker, the plaintiff brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal remedy when officials have denied a person rights secured
by the U.S. Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Thus, when the Washington State Supreme
Court addressed the plaintiff's claim, it reviewed only whether the officials had violated her Fourth
Amendment rights. Hocker, 95 Wash. 2d at 826, 631 P.2d at 375.
177. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d at 22, 691 P.2d at 941 (quoting State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75,
86, 516 P.2d 1088, 1095 (1973)).
178. 45 Wash. App. 228, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986).
179. Id. at 233, 724 P.2d at 1095.
180. 35 Wash. App. 455, 667 P.2d 139 (1983).
181. 10 Wash. App. 75,516 P.2d 1088 (1973).
182. See Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 232-33, 724 P.2d at 1095; see also Keller, 35 Wash. App.
at 458-59, 667 P.2d at 141-42 (analyzing Fourth Amendment and determining exception to its
warrant requirement exists for parolees and probationers); Simms, 10 Wash. App. at 84-85, 516
P.2d at 1094-95 (finding that, while protections of Fourth Amendment apply to parolees, law
enforcement officials may search such persons without warrants, when reasonable).
183. See Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 233, 724 P.2d at 1095 (citing Hocker v. Woody, 95 Wash.
2d 822, 826, 631 P.2d 372, 375 (1984)).
184. See State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 698, 92 P.3d 202, 207 (2004) (quoting State v.
Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833, 837 (1999), which held that, unlike Fourth
Amendment, article I, section 7 does not "operate[] on a downward ratcheting mechanism of
diminishing expectations of privacy").
185. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
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and therefore had a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrantless
search of his car was permissible. 186 The court stated that an
"expectation of privacy, even if reduced.., does not constitute
an
exception to the requirement of a warrant under article I, § 7.''187
Even more recently, in State v. Cheatam,188 the Washington State
Supreme Court reiterated that under article I, section 7 there are no
express limitations to the right to privacy, even where the rights of an
inmate are concerned. 89 The court engaged in separate federal and state
constitutional analyses to determine whether the search of a county jail
inmate's shoes was proper. 190 The court determined that when Cheatam
was booked into the prison, officers lawfully searched his shoes pursuant
to the inventory exception to the warrant requirement.1 9 1 Therefore,
when a law enforcement officer searched the shoes a second time,
Cheatam no longer had any objective expectation of privacy in the shoes
92
and thus the search did not constitute an invasion of his private affairs.
B.

Even If Probationers,Parolees,and Inmates Have a Reduced
Expectation of Privacy,Searches of These PersonsMust Be Based
on Some Level of Suspicion

If a court determines that probationers, parolees, and inmates have a
reduced expectation of privacy under article I, section 7, and thus may
be subject to searches on less than probable cause, searches of these

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 150 Wash. 2d 626, 81 P.3d 830 (2003).
189. Id. at 642, 81 P.3d at 838. In State v. Rainford, 86 Wash. App. 431, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997),
Division II rejected appellant Rainford's argument that article 1, section 7 provides greater
protections for prisoners than the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 437-38, 936 P.2d at 1213. The court
pointed out that Rainford had inadequately addressed the Gunwall factors because he did not cite
any cases analyzing a prisoner's expectation of privacy under the state constitution. Id.
Subsequently, the court determined that prisoners are afforded no greater protection under the state
constitution than they are under the Fourth Amendment. Id. However, because the Washington State
Supreme Court no longer requires Gunwall analysis for claims under article I, section 7, and
because that court has applied the protections of article I, section 7 to other inmates, the validity of
the Rainford opinion is questionable. See Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d at 694, 92 P.3d at 204 (finding that
Gunwall analysis is no longer needed for article 1, section 7 claims); Cheatam, 150 Wash. 2d at
637-38, 81 P.3d at 836 (applying article I, section 7 to search of inmate's shoes); Hendrickson, 129
Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.3d at 568 (applying article I, section 7 to search of inmate's car).
190. Cheatam, 150 Wash. 2d at 634-38, 81 P.3d at 834-36.
191. Id. at 632, 642, 81 P.3d at 833, 838.
192. See id. at 643, 81 P.3d at 839.
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individuals must still be based on some level of suspicion. 93
Washington State courts have held that the requisite suspicion existed
where a probationer ran quickly away from her probation officer and
appeared "extremely nervous,"' 194 and where a citizen-informant
provided information about a parolee's threats toward the informant.' 95
Thus, although searches of probationers, parolees, and inmates require
less than a finding of probable cause, law enforcement officials must
have some indication that the suspect has engaged in a violation of the
law in order to search that suspect.
IV. WASHINGTON STATE'S DNA COLLECTION STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7
The collection of a biological sample pursuant to Washington State's
DNA collection statute is an unconstitutional search because it involves
a warrantless bodily intrusion that does not fit within any of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Whether it is undertaken by
cheek swab or blood test, 196 DNA collection invades a person's private
affairs and constitutes a search under article I, section 7.197 This search
lacks the authority of law required under the state constitutional
provision because the statute does not require a warrant,' 98 nor does this
search fit within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
recognized by the Washington State courts. 199 The fact that the persons

addressed by this statute are convicted felons is inapposite, as article I,
section 7 protects the "private affairs" of these persons as it does other

193. See, e.g., State v. Wallin, No. 52920-0-I, 105 P.3d 1037, 1040 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2005)
(finding that searches of parolees require either "well founded" or "reasonable" suspicion); State v.
Lampman, 45 Wash. App. 228, 233, 724 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1986) ("The standard for determining
whether a search of a probationer is reasonable is whether the police or probation officer has a wellfounded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred.").
194. See Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 230, 234, 734 P.2d at 1093, 1095 (citations omitted).
195. See State v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 665-67, 620 P.2d 116, 117-18 (1980).
196. See State v. Surge, 122 Wash. App. 448, 451-52, 94 P.3d 345, 347 (2004).
197. See id. at 452, 94 P.3d at 348 (finding that DNA collection is search pursuant to Fourth
Amendment). Because the protections of article I, section 7 are "never less than those of the Fourth
amendment," Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d, 452, 465 (2000), DNA
collection thus constitutes a search under the state constitution, as well.
198. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2004).
199. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996); see also infra
Part IV.B.I (explaining why search pursuant to RCW 43.43.754 does not fall within any exception
to warrant requirement).
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citizens .200 Even if such persons do have diminished privacy rights, the
law still requires some level of suspicion before a search of these
persons can take place. 20 1 Because DNA collection pursuant to the state
statute constitutes a search without authority of law, it violates the
privacy protections of article I, section 7.
A.

Under Article 1, Section 7,DNA Collection Constitutes an Invasion
into a Person'sPrivateAffairs

The cheek swab or blood test conducted in compliance with
Washington State's DNA collection statute is an intrusion into a
person's private affairs. 2 An intrusion beneath the body's surface
necessarily implicates a person's "private affairs," for "[t]here... is no
doubt that the privacy interest in the body.. . is one Washington citizens
have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental
trespass., 20 3 Washington State courts, in interpreting the DNA collection
statute, have already deemed both cheek swabs and blood tests to be
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.20 4 Thus, because
article I, section 7 provides greater protections than the federal
constitution, 205 such intrusions are a search under the state constitution
as well.
B.

Washington State's DNA Collection Statute Does Not Provide
ProperAuthority of Law for a Search
The search prescribed by the DNA collection statute is not justified

200. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 65, 70, 917 P.2d at 565, 568 (applying protections of
article 1, section 7 to convicted felon).
201. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 691 P.2d 929, 941 (1984) (finding that at
least "well founded" suspicion is required). Some administrative searches do not require any level
of suspicion. See supra note 109. However, such searches still require a warrant. See State v.
Lansden, 144 Wash. 2d 654, 663, 30 P.3d 383, 487 (2001). Therefore, because the DNA collection
statute at issue here does not contain a warrant requirement, the search must be based on some level
of suspicion.
202. See Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 452, 94 P.3d at 348 (holding that DNA collection is search
pursuant to Fourth Amendment). Because the protections of article I, section 7 are "never less than
those of the Fourth amendment," Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d,
452, 465 (2000), DNA collection thus constitutes a search under the state constitution, as well.
203. Robinson, 102 Wash. App. at 819, 10 P.3d at 465.
204. See Surge, 122 Wash. App. at 452, 94 P.3d at 347-48.
205. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 70 n.1, 917 P.2d at 567 n.l (stating that Washington State
Supreme Court has "frequently held that art. I, § 7 affords more protection to individuals from
searches and seizures by the government than the Fourth Amendment").
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because it is not predicated on proper authority of law. The requisite
authority to comply with article I, section 7 may come either from a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.20 6 Even where a
search is conducted pursuant to statute, the search must still comply with
these requirements.207 Because the DNA collection statute does not
contain a warrant requirement, 20 8 it is unreasonable per se. 20 9 Because
DNA collection from felons does not satisfy any of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement, the statute lacks proper authority of law to justify
an invasion of private affairs.
1.

DNA Collection Under Washington State's DNA Collection Statute
Does Not Fall Within Any of the Exceptions to the Warrant
Requirement

One cannot justify DNA collection pursuant to the DNA collection
statute under any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. When
analyzing article I, section 7, the Washington State Supreme Court has
recognized only six limited and narrowly drawn exceptions to the
warrant requirement: (1) consent; (2) searches incident to a valid arrest;
(3) inventory searches; (4) plain view; (5) Terry investigative stops; and
(6) exigent circumstances. 21 0 A search conducted pursuant to the statute
cannot require the felon to voluntarily consent to DNA collection.2 1
DNA collection is not contemporaneous with arrest, nor is it undertaken
for purposes of officer safety or preservation of evidence.21 2 Thus it does
not fall within the search incident to arrest exception.2 13 Because the
21
search is of a person and not property, 14 it does not fit within the
21 5 Finally, DNA collection is not an
inventory search exemption.

206. See id. at 70-71, 917 P.2d at 568.

207. See supra Part II.C.3.
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2004).

209. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 70-71,917 P.2d at 568.
210. See id. at 71,917 P.2d at 568.
211. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754.

212. See id. at § 43.43.754(2) (stating that DNA collected "shall be used solely for the purpose of
providing DNA or other tests for identification analysis and prosecution of a criminal offense or for
the identification of human remains or missing persons").
213. See State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970, 974 (1977) (finding that search
incident to arrest must be "restricted in time and place in relation to the arrestee").
214. See State v. Surge, 122 Wash. App. 448, 451-52, 94 P.3d 345, 347 (2004) (finding that
collection of DNA sample involves either blood draw or cheek swab).
215. See Smith, 76 Wash. App. at 16, 882 P.2d at 194. The Smith court quoted State v. Gluck, 83
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observation of an item in plain view, 2 16 nor is it a mere surface-level
frisk, as in Terry.2t 7
The DNA collection statute also does not satisfy the "exigent
circumstances" exception. Courts created this exception for
circumstances in which it would be impractical for law enforcement
officials to obtain a warrant.2 18 A warrantless search is permissible in the
following exigent circumstances: (1) hot pursuit; (2) fleeing suspect; (3)
danger to arresting officer or to the public; (4) mobility of suspect's
vehicle; and (5) mobility or destruction of evidence.2 19 In all of these
circumstances, stopping to obtain a warrant would result in the loss of
evidence or risk an officer's safety. 220 Felons subject to DNA collection
are already under the state's control. 221 Therefore, none of these exigent
circumstances are applicable to the DNA collection context.
The exigent circumstances that have justified warrantless bodily
intrusions in some situations are not present under the DNA collection
statute. 222 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Washington State
Supreme Court have upheld warrantless blood draws where law
enforcement officers had a clear indication that the search would reveal
the desired evidence and such evidence would be lost if the officers
obtained a warrant prior to conducting the search.22 3 The risk of losing
evidence is not present in searches conducted pursuant to the DNA
collection statute because, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, a person's
Wash. 2d 424, 428, 518 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1974), which delineated the three purposes of an
inventory search: "(1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during detention, property belonging
to a detained person, (2) protecting police from liability due to dishonest claims of theft, and (3)
protecting temporary storage bailees against false charges." Smith, 76 Wash. App. at 16, 882 P. 2d
at 194. DNA collection cannot be justified under any of these rationales, as an individual's DNA
cannot be lost or stolen.
216. See State v. Patterson, 37 Wash. App. 275, 280-81, 679 P.2d 416, 421 (1984).
217. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1968).
218. See State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 60, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089-90 (1983) (listing situations
that constitute "exigent circumstances").
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 1, at 15. The persons subject to the DNA collection
statute have already been tried and convicted, and are not suspects in an ongoing criminal
investigation.
222. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); see also State v. Curran, 116
Wash. 2d 174, 184-85, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991) (holding that warrantless blood draws of
suspected drunken driving suspects were justified because alcohol dissipates in bloodstream).
223. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71; Curran, 116 Wash. 2d at 184-85, 804 P.2d at 564
(upholding warrantless blood draw of drunken driving suspect).
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DNA does not dissipate over time.224 When collecting DNA, law
enforcement officials can take the time to secure a warrant prior to the
collection without risking a loss of the desired evidence. Additionally,
law enforcement officials do not have cause to believe that the "desired
evidence" will be found when a search is conducted pursuant to the
DNA collection statute because the DNA is collected in part for the
purpose of prosecuting crimes that have yet to be committed, or for past
crimes for which law enforcement has no suspicion that DNA collection
from a particular person will yield information.225
2.

The Robinson Court Erred When It Determined that a Warrantless
Search Is PermissibleifIt Survives Strict Scrutiny

Under article I, section 7, strict scrutiny does not justify a warrantless
search. Although Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals
determined in Robinson v. City of Seattle that there is an exception to the
warrant requirement where a warrantless search survives strict
scrutiny, 226 the court relied on Fourth Amendment authority to support
its conclusion.22 7 Division I based its analysis and subsequent conclusion
on an erroneous determination that the Washington State Supreme Court
used strict scrutiny in In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E to determine the
constitutionality under article I, section 7 of post-conviction HIV
testing.228 However, the A, B, C, D, E court explicitly declined to decide
that case under the state constitutional provision because neither party
had briefed the Gunwall factors. 229 The court stated that it would
interpret the state constitutional provision under "federal Fourth
Amendment analysis. 2 3 ° Such analysis does not incorporate the full
224. See Burk, supra note 125, at 470.
225. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.43.754(2) (2004) (stating that DNA collected "shall be used
solely for the purpose of providing DNA or other tests for identification analysis and prosecution of
a criminal offense or for the identification of human remains or missing persons") (emphasis
added). Because the persons subject to RCW 43.43.754 have already been convicted of crimes, it
can be inferred that "prosecution of a criminal offense" relates to prosecution of afuture offense, or
a past offense that law enforcement has been unable to solve but where there is no suspicion that the
person from whom DNA is being collected is involved.
226. See Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 817, 10 P.3d 452, 464 (2000).

227. See id. (finding that test established in In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash. 2d 80, 847
P.2d 455 (1993), was correct test to apply in instant case).
228. See Robinson, 102 Wash. App. at 817-18, 10 P.3d at 464-65 (2000) (quoting A, B, C, D, E,
121 Wash. 2d at 96-97, 847 P.2d at 462).
229. A. B, C, D E, 121 Wash. 2d at 91 n.6, 847 P.2d at 459 n.6.
230. Id.
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extent of the privacy protections of article I, section 7.231 The
Washington State Supreme Court has maintained that for a search to be
lawful under the state constitution, it must either be supported by a
warrant or satisfy one of the few exceptions to the warrant
requirement.2 32 Thus, the DNA collection statute is not justifiable under
strict scrutiny analysis.
C.

Although the DNA Collection Statute Applies Only to Convicted
Felons, This Does Not Justify Intrusion into Felons' "Private
Affairs"

The persons subject to the DNA collection statute retain the same
article I, section 7 privacy rights as other citizens. Although some courts
have expressed that there are classes of persons who have a "reduced
expectation of privacy" under article I, section 7,233 the continuing
validity of these opinions is highly questionable. The courts that made
these determinations relied solely on Fourth Amendment, pre-Gunwall
authority. 3 More recent Washington State court decisions establish that
article I, section 7 protects the "private affairs" of incarcerated
persons.2 35 In Hendrickson and Cheatam, the court applied article I,
section 7 analysis to searches of inmates, thus illustrating that inmates
retain their state constitutional privacy protections.236 Therefore, an
individual's status as a convicted felon does not diminish that person's
article I, section 7 interest in protecting his or her "private affairs" with
231. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70 n.1, 917 P.2d 563, 567 n.l (1996) (stating
that Washington State Supreme Court has "frequently held that art. 1., § 7 affords more protection to
individuals from searches and seizures by the government than the Fourth Amendment").
232. See State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 695, 92 P.3d 202, 205 (2004).
233. See, e.g., State v. Lampman, 45 Wash. App. 228, 233, 724 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1986) (finding
that probationers have diminished expectations of privacy).
234. See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 691 P.2d 929, 941 (1984); Hocker v. Woody, 95
Wash. 2d 822, 826, 631 P.2d 372, 375 (1981); Lampman, 45 Wash. App. at 233, 724 P.2d at 1095.
235. See, e.g., State v. Cheatam, 150 Wash. 2d 626, 642, 81 P.3d 830, 838 (2003) (applying
article I, section 7 to search of inmate's shoes); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917
P.2d 563, 568 (1996) (applying article I, section 7 to search of inmate's car).
236. See Cheatam, 150 Wash. 2d at 641-42, 81 P.3d at 838; Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71,
917 P.2d at 568. The only case to the contrary is a court of appeals case, State v. Rainford, in which
the court determined that Rainford had not made a showing that prisoners have greater privacy
protections under article 1, section 7. State v. Rainford, 86 Wash. App. 431, 437-38, 936 P.2d 1210,
1213 (1997). However, the Washington State Supreme Court did apply state constitutional analysis
to the inmates in Hendrickson and Cheatam. Cheatam, 150 Wash. 2d at 641-42, 81 P.3d at 838;
Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.2d at 568. Thus, because the latter two cases remain good
law, it is evident that the privacy protections of the state constitution apply to incarcerated persons.
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respect to bodily intrusions.
Even if a court were to conclude that felons have diminished privacy
rights, the DNA collection statute still fails constitutional scrutiny
because it does not require law enforcement officials to have any level of
individualized suspicion prior to conducting a search.2 37 Courts require
some level of suspicion before law enforcement officials can invade the
private affairs of probationers, parolees, and inmates.238 Accordingly, the
Washington State DNA collection statute is invalid because it requires
law enforcement officials to collect DNA from felons, regardless of
whether the officials suspect that these persons have committed other
crimes.
In sum, the search required by Washington State's DNA collection
statute constitutes an invasion into a citizen's private affairs without
authority of law. An intrusion into the body is an intrusion into a
protected interest, and thus it may be undertaken only pursuant to a
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. A statute alone
cannot provide the proper authority to intrude in this way. Moreover, the
statute cannot be upheld on the grounds that it applies to a class of
persons with a reduced expectation of privacy because subjective
privacy interests are inapposite to the analysis under article I, section 7.
Finally, even searches of persons with reduced rights must be based on a
well-founded suspicion, an element that the DNA collection statute does
not require. Thus the statute violates article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although Washington State courts have upheld DNA collection under
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the broader privacy
rights granted under article I, section 7 of the state constitution require a
separate analysis. Under that analysis, the DNA collection statute
constitutes a disturbance of a person's private affairs without authority
of law. Collecting the biological sample required by the statute
necessarily involves a bodily intrusion, which Washington State courts
have determined constitutes a search, and therefore a disturbance of
private affairs. A warrantless search is unreasonable per se, and thus
such a search must fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant

237. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2004).
238. See supra Part II.B.
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requirement to be deemed constitutionally permissible. The fact that the
statute directs DNA collection only from convicted felons does not save
the statute, for courts have determined that invasions into the private
affairs of such persons are evaluated under the same criteria as searches
of other citizens. For these reasons, Washington State's DNA collection
statute is invalid under article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution.

